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The September 11 atrocities in the United States brought the threat of international terrorism sharply into focus for the entire world.  Following September 11, States have found themselves faced with the unenviable problem of finding a balance between the need to adequately secure themselves against this threat, and the imperative to ensure that any action taken in combating terrorist activities conforms to the principles of international law.  Recent controversial uses of force in Afghanistan (2001) and Iraq (2003) have highlighted the extreme difficulties in finding such a balance.  One lawful means of responding to international terrorism may be, in certain circumstances, resort to the inherent right of self-defense, upon which the United States based Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan.​[1]​  

As such, an understanding of the international law regarding self-defense is today more pertinent than ever.  This article aims to contribute to that understanding by focusing on a particular issue that relates to self-defense claims: the relevance today, in legal discourse and practice, of the hallowed Caroline incident of 1837.

It is clear that the international law concerning self-defense is derived from a number of sources.  Arguably the most important of these is Article 51 of the United Nations (UN) Charter.​[2]​  However, self-defense is also regulated by customary international law. As the International Court of Justice (ICJ) stated in the Nicaragua judgment: ‘There can be no doubt that the issues of the use of force and collective self-defense raised in the present proceedings are issues which are regulated both by customary international law and by treaties.’​[3]​  There are a number of aspects of the law on self-defense that are not apparent at all in Article 51, but rather have their basis solely in the practice and opinio juris of States.  Therefore, a complete understanding of the law of self-defense, so far as such a thing is possible, obviously requires analysis of legal requirements derived from both sources.​[4]​  Indeed, separating these two sources in this context is a somewhat artificial exercise.​[5]​  However, the nature of this article means that its focus is primarily upon customary international law aspects of self-defense.  As such, there are essential areas of the contemporary law governing self-defense that are not here discussed in detail, most notably the concept of an ‘armed attack’.

The customary international law regarding self-defense has traditionally been identified by reference to the correspondence exchanged between the United Kingdom and the United States in relation to the dispute over the sinking of the Caroline by British forces in 1837.  It is often held that the legal stance taken during this exchange represents accurately the position of the customary limitations on self-defense actions today.​[6]​  Certainly in the period since the inception of the UN, numerous scholars have referred to the incident, and the legal positions taken following it, as representing the law.

Yet in recent years, there has been a measure of academic re-appraisal the Caroline incident and its relevance to international law.  The acceptance of the Caroline as an aspect of customary international law and its regular invocation by scholars has been criticized.  Some have argued that the Caroline should be employed in a limited manner, and is today only relevant to certain ‘types’ of self-defense claim.​[7]​  Other writers have gone further, and suggested that viewing the incident as representing or relevant to the customary international law of self-defense is misconceived.  As such, continued reference to it further confuses the already muddy waters of this area of international law.​[8]​

These writings have stimulated important debate over the Caroline and its relevance today, where in the past the Caroline formula was often cited as ‘the law’ without question.  Many of the concerns that have been raised regarding the status today of the incident and (or, more accurately, the legal claims made with regard to it) have merit.  Nonetheless, it is argued here that none of the approaches taken in this recent wave of scholarly re-appraisal adequately identify the relevance of the incident to the customary international law of today.  In contrast to the other articles that have returned to the Caroline incident and discussed its relevance, this paper takes the methodological approach of examining State practice and opinio juris from the UN era to determine the content of customary international law today, against which the Caroline formula is analyzed.

Thus, as a starting point, Section II provides a brief account of the facts of the Caroline incident and the legal claims made by the parties involved.  Section III highlights the general invocation of the Caroline formula by scholars as embodying elements of the customary international law on self-defense in the UN era.  In Section IV, some of the criticisms that have been raised in relation to this general scholarly reverence are explored.  It is argued that, whilst these criticisms may be merited, in some respects they actually detract from the issue of the contemporary relevance of the Caroline formula.  We then turn, in Section V, to an examination of the practice and opinio juris of States regarding self-defense in the period since 1945.  The Caroline formula is compared and contrasted to the conclusions reached in this Section as to the content of current customary international law.  Based on this, it is argued in Section VI that the Caroline formula in itself does not represent contemporary customary international law.  Nonetheless, the total exclusion of the Caroline from scholarly discourse over the current position of the customary international law of self-defense is unhelpful, because the formula is an extremely useful tool to aid our understanding of this area of the law.

II. Facts and Legal Claims

In 1837, the United Kingdom was facing a rebellion in Canada, which at that time was still under British control.  It was in the context of this rebellion that British forces attacked and sank a forty-five ton, privately owned, United States steamer, the Caroline.  A number of the rebel forces acting in support of the Canadian rebellion, (the majority of which being United States nationals) were stationed on Navy Island, in British territory.  They were supplied in munitions and personnel by the Caroline, which was hired for that purpose.​[9]​  On 29 December, whilst the Caroline was docked at Schlosser, in United States territory, it was attacked by British-Canadian forces, who set fire to the steamer, and towed it over Niagara Falls.​[10]​  In the process Amos Durfree, a United States citizen, was killed.​[11]​

The territorial violation involved in the incident, coupled with the death of at least one American national, caused uproar amongst patriots in the United States, particularly in the State of New York.​[12]​  Indeed, President Van Buren himself, despite a reputation for timidity, referred to the incident as an ‘outrage’.​[13]​  Yet the diplomatic response to these rising tensions between Britain and the United States was fairly muted from both parties.​[14]​  It constituted a brief exchange of letters between the United States Secretary of State John Forsyth and the British Minister in Washington, Henry S. Fox,​[15]​ during which Forsyth demanded ‘redress’ on behalf of the United States.  In response to this, Fox argued that ‘the necessity of self-defense and self-preservation, under which Her Majesty’s subjects acted in destroying [the Caroline], would seem to be sufficiently established.’​[16]​  In addition, Andrew Stevenson, the American Minister to Britain, sent a letter regarding the incident to Lord Palmerston, the British Foreign Secretary, where he argued that, as there was no imminent danger to British forces, Britain could not claim to have acted in self-defense.​[17]​   Much to the ire of many Americans, it took Palmerston more than three years to respond to this letter.​[18]​

Despite such diplomatic mismanagement, the tensions over the Caroline had calmed somewhat by 1839, only for them to be re-ignited following the arrest in New York of Alexander McLeod, in November 1840.  McLeod, a British-Canadian, was apprehended due to his alleged part in the incident.​[19]​  The British responded to the arrest by stating that the attack was an official action, and thus McLeod could not be held personally responsible.​[20]​  McLeod was eventually found to be not guilty on the evidence and was released.​[21]​

The correspondence concerning the Caroline incident, and particularly that which followed McLeod’s arrest and trial, between the new United States Secretary of State Daniel Webster and the British special representative to the United States, Lord Ashburton, gave birth to the so called ‘Caroline formula’.

The most important extract of these various correspondences comes from a letter sent from Webster to Ashburton, dated 27 July 1842, in which Webster quoted a correspondence he had sent to Henry S. Fox in April 1841:

[I]t will be for Her Majesty’s Government to show, upon what state of facts, and what rules of national law, the destruction of the Caroline is to be defended. It will be for that Government to show a necessity of self-defense, instant, overwhelming, leaving no choice of means, and no moment for deliberation. It will be for it to show, also, that the local authorities of Canada, even supposing the necessity of the moment authorized them to enter the territories of the United States at all, did nothing unreasonable or excessive; since the act justified by the necessity of self-defense must be limited by that necessity, and kept clearly within it. It must be shown that admonition or remonstrance to the persons on board the Caroline was impracticable, or would have been unavailing; it must be shown that daylight could not be waited for; that there could be no attempt at discrimination, between the innocent and the guilty; that it would not have been enough to seize and detain the vessel; but that there was a necessity, present and inevitable, for attacking her, in the darkness of the night, while moored to the shore, and while unarmed men were asleep on board, killing some, and wounding others, and then drawing her into the current, above the cataract, setting her on fire, and, careless to know whether there might not be in her the innocent with the guilty, or the living with the dead, committing her to a fate, which fills the imagination with horror. A necessity for this, the Government of the United States cannot believe to have existed.​[22]​

The United States and the United Kingdom disagreed as to whether the British actions met these requirements as Webster set them out.  From the above passage, we can see that Webster clearly asserted that: ‘A necessity for this, the Government of the United States cannot believe to have existed.’  In contrast, Lord Ashburton responded on the 28 July with: 

I would appeal to you Sir, to say whether the facts which you say would alone justify the act…were not applicable to this case in as high a degree as they ever were to any case of a similar description in the history of nations.​[23]​

Yet, Lord Ashburton also stated that ‘we are perfectly agreed as to the general principles of international law applicable to this unfortunate case’.​[24]​  Indeed, he repeated Webster’s terminology (specifically that States must show ‘a necessity of self-defense, instant, overwhelming, leaving no choice of means, and no moment for deliberation.’) on more than one occasion in the correspondence.​[25]​  Thus it would seem that while there was disagreement between the parties as to the factual nature of the episode, they were in agreement as to Webster’s statement of the law.​[26]​

III. A Mythical Authority

In the Caroline exchange, many writers since the time of the League of Nations have found the basis for the customary international law concerning self-defense.  Jennings famously referred to the incident as the locus classicus of the law of self-defense.​[27]​  This view has, in the majority, continued into the UN era.​[28]​  Indeed, Gray rightly refers to the incident as having obtained a ‘mythical authority.’​[29]​  The general academic position on the Caroline incident during the UN era may be summarized by the following: 

The Caroline doctrine asserts that use of force by one nation against another is permissible as a self-defense action only if force is both necessary and proportionate…[the correspondence relating to the incident] effectively defined the limits of self-defense, and in so doing enabled later statesmen and scholars to distinguish that concept, with its constraints, from the largely limitless notion of self-preservation.​[30]​

The Caroline is still consistently referred to by international scholars today as embodying the customary law on self-defense, as can be seen from the response to the United States intervention in Afghanistan following September 11.  Byers, for example, states that from the Caroline incident ‘the modern law of self-defense was born.’  He then applies the formula to Operation Enduring Freedom of 2001.​[31]​  Recent reference to the Caroline is similarly well evidenced by a document prepared by the Chatham House International Law Programme in 2005, following the consultation of a number of eminent international legal scholars in the United Kingdom, entitled ‘Principles of International Law on the Use of Force by States in Self-Defense’.​[32]​  As such, it is notable that the Caroline exchange is referred to throughout this document, as representing the applicable customary international law standard in this context.​[33]​  In addition to this regular invocation, it should be noted that some writers have re-affirmed the importance of the Caroline, and have explicitly defended the relevance of Webster’s formula to contemporary self-defense claims.​[34]​  

IV. Recent Re-Appraisal 

However, this acceptance of the Caroline by the majority of scholars has faced some criticism in recent years.  There are a number of issues that have been raised to suggest that the scholarly reverence the Caroline incident and formula have received may be misplaced.  The following section briefly examines some of these issues. 

i) The Formula was not Customary International Law in 1837

Despite the apparent agreement between Ashburton and Webster as to the law covering the Caroline incident (if not the application of that law to the particular facts), it is arguable that Webster’s formula was not representative of the customary international law in 1837.​[35]​  The formula set out by Daniel Webster was not in conformity with much of the practice of States, which in general employed a wider and more ‘vague’ right of ‘self-preservation’ at the time.​[36]​  Indeed, there is some debate as to what the exact legal argument made by the British was.  Daniel Webster clearly referred to the concept of ‘self-defense’ when making his famous statement quoted above, but it has been questioned whether the Caroline attack was in fact justified as ‘self-defense’, ‘self-preservation’ or ‘necessity’.​[37]​  

All of these terms were used interchangeably at the time to justify inter-State use of force during peacetime.  Some scholars do take the view that the Caroline incident was justified by the British as being an example of self-defense,​[38]​ whilst others hold that the British pleaded ‘self-preservation’ or the virtually synonymous justification of ‘necessity’, as there was no involvement on the part of the United States government.​[39]​  Examining the correspondence regarding the incident as a whole, it is evident that the term ‘self-defense’ is employed much more regularly throughout than other related terms.  Having said this, whilst Webster spoke of ‘self-defense,’ Lord Palmerston apparently saw the British action as one of ‘necessity.’​[40]​  This view of the legal argumentation employed has been adopted by the International Law Commission (ILC), which has twice referred to the Caroline formula (in the context of its examination of the law of State responsibility) as representing a plea of ‘necessity’ rather than one of self-defense.  For example, in 2001, the ILC stated that ‘[t]he Caroline incident of 1837, though frequently referred to as an instance of self-defense, really involved the plea of necessity at a time when the law concerning the use of force had a quite different basis than it has now.’​[41]​

In any event, it has been argued that Webster’s formula did not represent the law as it was: rather, it went beyond the existing legal framework.  A good example from practice to suggest this is the British action against the Copenhagen naval fleet in 1807, in response to the supposed threat of Napoleon launching an attack from Denmark.  The British government claimed the action was ‘necessary for the nation’s preservation.’​[42]​  It is suggested that based upon the Caroline formula, the action would have been considered disproportional (or to use Webster’s terminology, ‘excessive’), particularly given the bombardment of Copenhagen proper.​[43]​  Indeed, the Caroline formula was not even in conformity with recent United States practice.​[44]​  This is evidenced by two incursions into Spanish territory in 1817: the occupation of Amelia Island and the invasion of Spanish held Florida.​[45]​  In both cases, the United States claimed it was acting in ‘self-defense’,​[46]​ but it seems unlikely that either instance would have met the Caroline formula.​[47]​

Therefore, it is certainly arguable that the formula put forward by Daniel Webster was not an expression of the law as it existed in 1837.

ii) A Single Incident Cannot Create Customary International Law

Acknowledging that the formula set out by Daniel Webster was unlikely to have been an expression of customary international law as it was at the time, Jennings stated in his famous 1938 article that ‘[i]t was in the Caroline case that self-defense was changed from a political to a legal doctrine.’​[48]​  In his view, therefore, the exchange of letters following the sinking of the Caroline created new customary international law.​[49]​  However, it seems highly problematic to conclude that an exchange of letters between two States could create a legal obligation binding upon all.  Today, it is generally accepted that for customary international law to form there must be a level of ‘constant and uniform practice,’ to use a statement employed in a classic pronouncement by the ICJ on the formation of customary international law.​[50]​  

Of course, this representation of customary international law formation is a standard of the mid-twentieth century; therefore it may be seen as dangerous to apply this criterion to an exchange of letters that took place in the mid-nineteenth century.  However, the idea of widespread consent as an aspect of customary law formation (or to use the ICJ’s term, ‘constant and uniform practice’) did exist at the time of the Caroline incident, and indeed well before it.​[51]​ 

iii) Agreement was Reached for Political, not Legal Reasons

A related issue is whether the diplomatic exchange regarding the Caroline was of such a character as to be able to contribute to the formation of customary international law at all.  It has been argued that the ‘agreement’ between the United States and the United Kingdom (or perhaps rather between Webster and Ashburton) was a political one. As such, any apparent legal principles expressed were put forward merely for political reasons.  In other words, it has been claimed that Ashburton approved Webster’s formula as a diplomatic concession, not as a formal matter of law.​[52]​  Both parties clearly wanted a peaceful resolution to the tension between them over the incident.  For example, Lord Ashburton stated his desire that ‘all feelings of ill-will resulting from these truly unfortunate events may be buried in oblivion.’​[53]​  

It is certainly possible that the parties’ legal arguments were made, and an agreement reached, for political reasons.  This in itself is not a great insight and has little bearing upon the contribution of the diplomatic exchange to customary international law.  All State practice (and indeed, opinio juris) has political elements to it.  States form the law and respond to it in their best political interests, and we would be naive to think otherwise.​[54]​  Underlying political motivation in itself does not diminish the ‘legal’ nature of formal legal claims regarding State practice.  If it did, customary international law would not exist at all.

iv) The Formula was not Adopted into Practice

Even if it is accepted that the Caroline correspondence could have unilaterally ‘created’ customary international law, it is evident that in the period following the Caroline incident, Webster’s formulation did not figure prominently in the practice of States.  This lack of application of the Caroline criteria in the immediate pre-UN period is evidenced, inter alia, by the Corfu incident.  In 1923, Italy responded to an assassination of an Italian national against Greece by bombing and occupying Corfu.  Whilst it did not explicitly invoke ‘self-defense’, Mussolini’s government stressed that its intervention in Corfu was a lawful and ‘pacific’ response to the assassination.​[55]​  This action was clearly disproportionate based on any reasonable calculation, yet the League of Nations ‘Council of Ambassadors’ that dealt with the dispute failed to condemn the actions of the Italian government, and the proportionality criterion was left unconsidered.​[56]​  Indeed, the Council held that the occupation was lawful.​[57]​

Incidents like the occupation of Corfu would suggest that the Caroline did not alter the course of customary international law regarding self-defense in the manner that UN era scholars claim.​[58]​

v) The Formula was Limited to Certain Types of Self-Defense

In addition to the above contentions, it has been argued that the factual circumstances of the Caroline incident limit the application of the formula enunciated by Webster to a specific ‘type’ of self-defense claim.​[59]​  The contention here is that Daniel Webster intended to articulate the legal structure applicable to the facts of the Caroline incident itself, and not to other claims of ‘self-defense’.  However, those who make this criticism do not always agree as to what specific factual instance the doctrine was limited to.  For example, it has been argued that the Caroline formula is only relevant to actions of anticipatory self-defense, as the incident can be viewed as being of this character.​[60]​  The rebels on Navy Island had not yet launched an attack against British territory.​[61]​  Therefore it has been claimed that the requirements set down by Webster need only be met when there has not yet been an attack against the responding State. 

Alternatively, as the actions of the Caroline and its crew were not imputable to the United States government, it has been claimed the Caroline formula is only relevant to self-defense actions against non-State actors, and not action taken in self-defense by one State against another.​[62]​  Expanding on this, Kearley takes the view that the Caroline exchange was limited to the very specific situation of: 

[E]xtra-territorial uses of force by a State in peacetime against another State which is unable or unwilling to prevent its territory from being used as a base of operations for hostile activities against the State taking action.​[63]​

This view is supported by the fact that Webster indicated that in circumstances when an action taken avowedly in self-defense ‘has led to the commission of hostile acts within the territory of a power at peace, nothing less than a clear and absolute necessity can afford a ground of justification.’​[64]​  Kearley argues that this indicates that Webster felt that in different circumstances, self-defense may be justified based upon criteria other than those he was expounding.​[65]​  However, this seems a tenuous inference: Webster’s intention with regard to the scope of the formula he was articulating can only be guessed.​[66]​  Certainly though, his focus was understandably upon the specific incident of the Caroline and the circumstances relevant to that incident: ‘Under these circumstances, and under those immediately connected with the transaction itself, it will be for Her Majesty’s Government to show upon what state of facts, and what rules of national law, the destruction of the Caroline is to be defended.’​[67]​

On this basis, it might be argued that the Caroline formula as set out by Webster was limited to anticipatory action, of an extra-territorial nature, taken against non-state actors (all of which describe the facts of the Caroline incident).  Alternatively, it may have been intended to have been limited to one of, or a combination of, these.

vi) A Different Approach

When considering the relevance of the Caroline formula today, it is important to keep all of the above points in mind.  Most of these arguments have merits and are generally overlooked by those who cite the Caroline as a convenient expression of customary international law.  However, it is here argued that some of the scholars that have re-visited the Caroline have been overly concerned with such issues.  The status of the law of self-defense (if indeed such a thing existed at all) in 1842 and the question of whether the Webster’s formula could have ‘created’ customary international law are issues which are in many ways irrelevant to the position of the formula today.  It may well be correct to hold that the Caroline correspondence, for a number of reasons, should not have influenced customary international law in the UN era.  However, the question to be asked is whether the Caroline formula has in fact been adopted by States in the UN era as an aspect of customary international law.  Admittedly merited concerns regarding the status of Caroline formula at the time of the incident have detracted from this essential question.  It is argued that the actual status of the Caroline formula today is the most pertinent issue here, not what the status of the formula was or ‘should be’ today. 

A single incident can in the long term form the basis of customary international law, if it is later applied in practice and supported by additional opinio juris.  In such instances, though, it is the cumulative effect of any subsequent acceptance of the ‘legal’ claims made in relation to the incident that would give the rules expressed in those claims their normative value, not the individual incident itself.​[68]​  This is essentially the same process as when the provisions of a treaty take on the character of customary international law (and potentially therefore bind States not party to the original treaty) due to the impact of the convention upon subsequent State practice and opinio juris.​[69]​  

Whilst the Caroline formula is obviously of a very different character to a formal treaty, the same process is possible: if the formula has, in the UN era, been sufficiently adopted in the practice of States, then it will have taken on the status of a binding rule of customary international law, irrelevant of its status when it was first expressed.  Similarly, if the formula contained within the Caroline exchange is today employed in relation to all manifestations or claims of self-defense, then it becomes irrelevant whether the formula was originally intended to apply to certain ‘types’ of that inherent right.  

V. State Practice and Opinio Juris in the United Nations Era 

The only way, therefore, to adequately assess the contemporary relevance of the Caroline is to examine UN era State practice (and opinio juris) with regard to the formula.  It should be noted here that throughout this Section, examples are given from practice to support the views presented on the current customary international law regarding self-defense.  In the majority of cases, these examples are employed to highlight wider practice, not to evidence in themselves the existence of customary international law. 

i) State Invocation of the Formula

In examining State opinio juris since the inception of the UN, the most obvious starting point is to identify instances where States have explicitly invoked the Caroline incident in the context of their self-defense claims, or the self-defense claims of others.  Considering the scholarly invocation of the formula, the results here are somewhat arresting.  On occasion, States do refer to the Caroline incident in relation to their self-defense claims, or those of others.  For example, Iraq invoked the Caroline incident and Webster’s formula in regard to its conflict with Iran in 1980.​[70]​  Similarly, Israel referred to the Caroline explicitly in relation to its invocation of self-defense to protect its nationals at Entebbe Airport, Uganda, in 1976.​[71]​  In defending its aerial strike against the Iraqi Osiraq nuclear reactor in 1981, Israel again pointed to the Caroline, though this was to indicate that it was inapplicable to the facts of the case,​[72]​ whilst Uganda referred to the Caroline in the context of condemning the same action.​[73]​  However, despite the claims of some writers,​[74]​ such invocation is rare, certainly in the UN era.  

Of course, this in itself does not mean that the Caroline formula is not part of contemporary customary international law.  The mere fact that States do not use the term ‘the Caroline’ is not determinative in this respect.  States may employ and be bound by Webster’s formula without using ‘the Caroline’ itself as a term of art.

Yet upon a closer examination, it is also true that States rarely refer to Webster’s formula either.  Thus the view that the formula itself is a rule of international law is hard to maintain when it is so rarely invoked.  Again, of course, there is practice contrary to this; a well known example being the fact that the representative of Ghana referred to Webster’s formula (though not the Caroline incident) when addressing the Security Council with regard to the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962.​[75]​  However, neither the United States, nor any other State made mention of Webster’s formula in relation to the Crisis.  Sierra Leone cited Webster’s formula as constituting an aspect of customary international law without referring to the Caroline itself in relation to the Osiraq incident.​[76]​  However, as with explicit invocation of the Caroline incident, such practice is exceptional.

It is often pointed out that the International Military Tribunal at Nuremburg explicitly referred to the Caroline formula.​[77]​  However in the UN era, the ICJ has not done so.  Throughout the cases where the Court has dealt with self-defense, it at no time refers to the Caroline incident.​[78]​  This is particularly interesting in relation to the Nicaragua case.  Here, the ICJ was unable to apply Article 51, or indeed any multilateral treaty provisions, to the dispute, due to the multilateral treaty reservation of the United States.​[79]​  As such, the Court reached its merits decision, ostensibly at least, by reference to customary international law alone.  If such law was enshrined in the Caroline incident, it would seem logical that the Court would have referred to it at some point during its judgment.  

Of course, only so much can be read into the fact that the Court has not referred to the Caroline.  The ICJ often refers to rules of ‘customary international law’ without giving examining supporting State practice.​[80]​  However, the Caroline formula is more than another mere example of State practice: it is an expression of a legal standard.   It might be argued that the ICJ has applied the Caroline formula to the relevant disputes before it implicitly, but this cannot be said with certainty.​[81]​  Certainly a contrast exists between the explicit reference to the Caroline made by the Tribunal at Nuremburg, and the fact that the ICJ has not done so.  However, what may be inferred from this is open to debate. 

Nonetheless, taken together, the lack of invocation by both States and the ICJ indicates prima facie that the general scholarly reverence of the Caroline is in fact misplaced.  The revisionist conception of Caroline as an unhelpful and inaccurate representation of international law would therefore seem correct.  However, even the fact that States do not as such employ Webster’s formula in the UN era is not enough for us to dismiss the Caroline incident as an outdated distraction.  

This is because it is undeniable that a response taken in self-defense today must be both ‘necessary’ and ‘proportional’ for it to be legally permissible.  There is overwhelming State practice supporting this position: indeed, State reference to necessity and proportionality in invoking self-defense is near universal, and States responding to such invocations in general similarly refer to the requirements, either explicitly or through implicit application.​[82]​  The writings of scholars in general concur with the view that this practice is almost universal.​[83]​  Notably, in contrast to the lack of reference to the Caroline formula itself, the ICJ has repeatedly and unequivocally endorsed the concepts of necessity and proportionality as elements of the customary international law governing self-defense.  For example, the Court has stated that: ‘The submission of the exercise of the right of self-defense to the conditions of necessity and proportionality is a rule of customary international law.’​[84]​ 

When one begins to examine the criteria of necessity and proportionality as they appear in customary international law today, it soon becomes clear that many parallels exist between these contemporary criteria and the Caroline formula.  The requirements of necessity and proportionality, uncontroversial aspects of contemporary customary international law, can be ‘easily’ identified in the Caroline exchange.​[85]​   Given this, it is difficult to deny the influence of the Caroline on the law of today.  Equally, however, the contemporary criteria and the Caroline formula are not synonymous.  







The scope of the contemporary necessity criterion is notoriously indeterminate.​[86]​  This is largely due to the fact that, along with proportionality, application of the requirement is highly context specific.​[87]​  Thus any attempt to find a general scope to the criterion is difficult.

As noted, the concept of ‘necessity’ can easily be identified as an aspect of the Caroline formula.  Daniel Webster held that there must be ‘a necessity of self-defense’.​[88]​  Elucidating further, the Caroline formula indicates that the need to respond in self-defense must be ‘overwhelming’ and ‘leaving no choice of means’. ​[89]​  It has been argued that the formula therefore indicates that the attack being responded to must be of a nature as to threaten fundamentally the survival of, or at least the vital interests of, a State.​[90]​  Such an interpretation is supported by Webster’s statement, elsewhere in the same letter, that ‘nothing less than a clear and absolute necessity can afford a ground of justification.’​[91]​  This would mean attacks that have a detrimental effect upon a State would not necessitate a response, unless they impinge upon the continued existence of the State.  It is true that States sometimes refer to a particular use of force in self-defense as being necessary to ‘protect its vital interests’​[92]​ or something similar, but these are not the only circumstances where self-defense is claimed and accepted.  In practice, nothing so devastating as ‘survival’ is required before a response can be seen as legally necessary:

The reality of self-defense in inter-State relations is much more prosaic: it transcends life-or-death existential crises and impinges on a host of commonplace situations involving the use of counter-force.​[93]​

For example, in relation to the Falklands conflict of 1982, the military response of the United Kingdom was generally accepted as a lawful self-defense action,​[94]​ yet it could hardly be claimed that the occupation of the Falklands posed a significant threat the infrastructure or survival of the United Kingdom.  Another example is the responses of Zambia, Botswana and Zimbabwe in repelling South African forces that launched a series of attacks avowedly against African National Congress (ANC) operation centers in those States in 1986.  These responses were all seen as necessary by other States.​[95]​  Indeed, this was so accepted that it was hardly brought into question.​[96]​  This was despite the fact that the attacks were of a comparatively minor nature and did not fundamentally threaten the stability of any of the responding States.  

Therefore, the criterion of ‘necessity’ in customary international law is not to be viewed as a requirement of ‘absolute necessity’ or ‘do-or-die’.  Nonetheless, it can still be said that necessity is only established if the action is to be considered a ‘last resort’.​[97]​  A State can use force in self-defense only if there is no other option open to it to defend itself, yet this need not be to defend itself from total destruction.

However, the idea of ‘last resort’ has two distinct interpretations.  One of these is procedural, whilst the other is more abstract.  These are often not distinguished in the literature, and are certainly not explicitly distinguished in State practice.  This leads to confusion as to what is required of States when the necessity criterion is applied to particular incidents.

First, it is concluded by some writers that necessity requires an exhaustion of means: ‘the action must be by way of a last resort after all peaceful means have failed.​[98]​  Second, it could be argued that a State must show either that it resorted to peaceful measures before using force or that it was not reasonable or ‘feasible’​[99]​ to turn to peaceful measures at all.

Taking the first interpretation, a State would have to demonstrate that it has actively sought peaceful resolution prior to using force.  This would imbue the necessity criterion with a procedural or administrative element,​[100]​ akin to the oft used compromissory clause in a treaty providing the ICJ with jurisdiction over a dispute only after diplomatic negotiations have failed.​[101]​  It has been argued that the phrase ‘no choice of means’ from Caroline embodies such an interpretation of the concept of ‘necessity’, and this has been criticized on the basis that it requires a State to exhaust all peaceful means (such as referring the matter to the Security Council) before using any force, even while a State is being attacked.​[102]​   

States do at times refer to a failed attempt to negotiate when stressing that the actions that they have taken are necessary,​[103]​ or conversely States are sometimes condemned for not having exhausted peaceful means prior to acting in self-defense.​[104]​  On initial inspection, such practice would suggest that a peaceful means of resolution must first be sought before force can be lawfully employed.  However, upon closer examination, it is clear that such attempts are not always taken, and a failure to negotiate does not automatically lead to an action being condemned as unnecessary by third party States.​[105]​  Further, when States refer to the fact that they have attempted to negotiate they do not indicate that they were legally bound to do so.  For example, in relation to the 2001 intervention in Afghanistan, the United States made a number of demands of the Taliban regime prior to the use of force, offering ultimatums if these were not met.  The Taliban rejected these demands.​[106]​  Yet, there was no indication that the United States felt itself required to seek to resolve the matter without the use of force, or that it saw these ultimatums as anything other than politically or strategically relevant.  Indeed, it has been argued that the United States had a number of possible non-forcible options open to it with regard to Afghanistan, which it failed to explore, meaning that Operation Enduring Freedom was unnecessary.​[107]​ 

As such, the failure to exhaust all peaceful means is not legally determinative as to whether a response was necessary or unnecessary.  It is not a requirement that a State attempt negotiation prior to launching a forcible response, or to wait for the Security Council to conclude a debate on an issue before acting.​[108]​  These factors are merely evidence, albeit strong evidence, of necessity.  Indeed, such a requirement of peaceful negotiation seems unrealistic in the reality of international disputes involving force.  There may not be the time for negotiation or even complaint on the part of a defending State before force in defensive response is necessary.​[109]​

Therefore, we turn to the second interpretation of whether an action was taken as a ‘last resort’: a State must show either that it resorted to peaceful measures before using force or that it was not reasonable for it to do so.  It may be that, in the case of a large scale attack or an invasion of the defending State’s territory, this is proved per se.​[110]​  Whether this is the case or not, the requirement of ‘last resort’ will be met so long as it may be established that it would have been unreasonable to expect the defending State to attempt to employ means other than force to resolve the situation.  Thus the statement from the Caroline exchange arguing that there must be ‘no choice of means’ should be interpreted to mean that the criterion of necessity requires that the defending State has ‘no reasonable choice of means’.​[111]​  If an attack is of such a character that it would not be reasonable to expect a State to seek alternative non-forcible means of defensive response, then it would appear that the responding State does not need to do so.  As this was phrased in the ‘Principles of International Law on the Use of Force by States in Self-Defense’ document prepared by the Chatham House International Law Programme in 2005: ‘There must be no practical alternative to the proposed use of force that is likely to be effective in ending or averting the attack.’​[112]​

It should be noted that this is not an alteration of the famous phrase from the Caroline as such.  By looking more closely a Webster’s formula, we see that he envisaged the possibility of it not being reasonable for a State to first resort to peaceful measures: ‘It must be shown that admonition or remonstrance to the persons on board the Caroline was impracticable, or would have been unavailing.’​[113]​

However, having examined the way necessity has been applied in the UN era, it is perhaps too stringent to hold that the need to respond must be ‘overwhelming’ (to use Webster’s terminology), unless ‘overwhelming’ is taken to be a bland synonym for ‘necessary’.  Interpreting ‘overwhelming’ to mean ‘fundamental’ or ‘total’ we see that this aspect of the Caroline formula may paint an inaccurate picture of the contemporary necessity criterion, at least in relation to self-defense taken in response to an actual attack.  Instead, it is more accurate to conclude that there must be a ‘reasonable’ need to respond with force based upon a balancing of States rights and interests against the general prohibition of the use of force. 





If anything, the proportionality requirement is even less well defined in the context of the jus ad bellum than the necessity criterion.​[114]​  The difficulty here is in establishing to what the response taken must be proportional.  In other words, how does one calculate proportionality?

There are two distinct but related possibilities.  Is the use of force taken in response to be commensurate with 1) the scale and means of the attack being responded to (in terms of destruction of life and property)​[115]​ or 2) the defensive requirements of the defending state (meaning that the measures taken are proportional to the ultimate goal of abating the attack suffered)?  These methods of assessing proportionality cannot be neatly separated, and in reality both of them affect whether a use of force in self-defense will be considered ‘proportional’ to some degree.

In this context, the Caroline correspondence offers little guidance as to how proportionality is to be assessed, with the key phrase being ‘excessive’; whether this means excessive in the context of the nature of the attack or the goal of ending the attack is hard to determine.  Closer analysis of Webster’s formulation suggests that the proportionality question is related to the right of the victim State to defend itself, rather than to the specifics of the particular attack that it is defending itself against: ‘the act justified by the necessity of self-defense must be limited by that necessity, and kept clearly within it.’​[116]​   Yet, this interpretation is not conclusive.

An analysis of practice does offer some guidance as to how the proportionality criterion is to be applied.  In the majority of cases, States appear to refer to proportionality as requiring equivalence between the response and the level of force required to abate the attack being responded to, not as an equivalence of scale or means between the response and the attack being responded to.  In other words, a response in self-defense must be both necessary and proportional to that necessity.

For example, in the Indo-Pakistani conflict over Kashmir in 1947-1948, Pakistan made it clear that it was responding with a degree of force necessary to protect its security, and saw itself as limited to not going beyond this level.​[117]​  It seemingly accepted that this may go beyond an equivalence of scale or means with regard to the deployment of Indian forces.  It should be noted however that Pakistan’s action was not accepted as lawful by all third party States.​[118]​  In the same conflict, India’s initial response was taken to combat irregular Pathan tribesmen, apparently directed by Pakistan.​[119]​  In combating this with a full-scale regular armed response (which itself was similarly responded to by Pakistan), India appeared to take action that was disproportionate in terms of scale and means, given the comparatively limited number of Pathan tribesmen located in Kashmir.  However, this action may be viewed as being commensurate to the goal of abating the tribal forces, in that the sporadic and targeted attacks of the tribesmen would have been difficult to respond to with a force of an equivalent size.  India’s action was implicitly accepted by the members of the Security Council.​[120]​

In invoking self-defense in the context of its clashes with Tunisia on Tunisian territory in 1958, France stressed that its forces were legally entitled to use ‘all means at their disposal’ to abate the ‘attacks’ its troops had suffered.​[121]​  More recently, it was in general accepted that the British action in the Falklands conflict was proportional to the incursion of its territory by Argentina.​[122]​  Here the Security Council passed Resolutions demanding that Argentina withdraw from the islands.​[123]​  It has been argued that the action taken by the United Kingdom was designed to be proportional to securing this goal, given the Security Council’s implicit acceptance of its position.​[124]​  A similar point has been made regarding the Gulf conflict of 1991, following Resolutions 660 and 661.​[125]​  In this case the action of the coalition can be seen to be an attempt to achieve compliance with these Resolutions, and the Security Council accepted that ‘all necessary means’ could be employed in self-defense to secure an Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait.​[126]​  Thus the representative of the United Kingdom to the Security Council during the Gulf conflict of 1991 stated that:

[T]he nature and scope of military action is dictated not by some abstract set of criteria but by the military capacity of the aggressor, who has refused all attempts to remove him from Kuwait.​[127]​

This suggests that the question was seen as being an assessment of what was necessary to liberate Kuwait, given the capacity of Iraq.

Finally, the Israeli action directed at the militant group Hezbollah, in Lebanese territory, in 2006 offers a useful example, not least because this action was far from universally accepted as a proportional one taken in self-defense.  Indeed, it may be said that the main basis for legal criticism of that action was the disproportionate nature of the response taken.​[128]​  Interestingly, when the Russian Federation argued that the Israeli action did not meet the test for proportionality in self-defense, it implicitly indicated how it perceived that test should be calculated.  The Russian representative in the Security Council argued that the ‘scale of the use of force’ went well beyond that necessary for ‘achieving this purpose…[of] a counter-terrorist operation.’​[129]​  For its part, Israel stated in an official release of its Ministry of Foreign Affairs that:

One important principle established by international law…is that the proportionality of a response to an attack is to be measured not in regard to the specific attack suffered by a State but in regard to what is necessary to remove the overall threat.​[130]​  

As such, Russia and Israel took the same position as to the method by which the proportionality aspect of self-defense is to be calculated, despite reaching different conclusions based on the facts as to whether the criteria had been fulfilled in the case of the Lebanon conflict.


These incidents indicate to some degree that in application, the proportionality criterion requires an equivalence of between the response taken in self-defense and the goal of abating the attack being responded to.​[131]​  However, an understanding of the proportionality criterion is not this simple.  There is equally practice that would seem to run contrary to this idea.  In the context of the East Pakistan conflict of 1971, Pakistan clearly viewed India’s actions as disproportionate given the scale of their activity.  The Pakistani objection was based upon the fact that India’s action was disproportional to the attacks it claimed Pakistan had instigated against it in terms of the scale of those attacks, not in relation to what was required to abate them.​[132]​  In relation to the Israeli incursions into Lebanon in February 1972, Argentina argued that this conduct was disproportionate ‘in terms of the scale of the action’.​[133]​  Similar points were made by the representatives of France​[134]​ and Sudan.​[135]​  In relation to the 2002 Korean naval clash, North Korea indicated that it had acted in self-defense, as evidenced by the fact that it had responded in kind to an attack by the South, in terms of means and scale.​[136]​

On analyzing the practice, it seems that, in the main, States refer to equivalence between the response taken and the goal of restoring security, rather than the scale employed.  Thus Wedgwood has pointed out, ‘in the exercise of self-defense, a country is not limited to a predetermined ratio or exact relation between the acts of provocation and the force used in response.’​[137]​  This is the position taken by several scholars.​[138]​  However, in many cases States do also refer to the scale or means of the response as being relevant to proportionality.  This makes sense, as the two methods of assessing proportionality are necessarily linked.  A response that is disproportionate in scale to the initial attack is also likely to be disproportional to the goal of abating that attack.

For example, during the Falklands conflict the United Kingdom took the decision not to attack mainland Argentina.​[139]​  How far this was a decision based on the legal restraints of proportionality and how far it was due to political prudence is debatable.​[140]​  Nonetheless, in this context, such an attack, had it occurred, could potentially be seen to be disproportionate both in terms of the scale of force and in terms of what was necessary to abate the attack on the islands.​[141]​   

Therefore, the question is not merely one of balancing the response with the legitimate defensive aims of responding: it would seem that there is also a need for States to ensure a level of equivalence in terms of the scale of their activity to that of the initial attack.  Dinstein suggests that both methods of assessing proportionality are employed, but in different contexts.  For him, there is a distinction between single uses of force in self-defense, what he terms ‘defensive armed reprisals,’ and a ‘full scale war of self-defense’.​[142]​  In the former case, the question is simply one of scale, in the latter proportionality is to be assessed with regard to the general goal of abatement.​[143]​  In fact, such a distinction is hard to support in practice.  Instead States employ a combination of the two methods in assessing proportionality, whether their self-defense action constitutes a solitary response or the entrance into full blown conflict.  However, from our study above it would appear that the primary equation is based upon the defensive goal to be achieved.

This combination of methods 1 and 2 above provide a dual aspect to the proportionality criterion.​[144]​  It is under this complex construction of proportionality that the goal of securing against future attacks may be acceptable, even if the action taken to ensure this is in some measure disproportionate in scale to the initial attack (thus allowing States to cross the border into the territory of the invading State to repel them beyond the frontier).​[145]​  However some equivalence of scale must be taken into account, meaning that attacks that are wholly disproportionate in terms of scale (such as regime change) are unlikely to be legally proportional.​[146]​

This lengthy discussion of the proportionality criterion has been undertaken specifically to highlight the complexity of the requirement, and the inherent difficulty in applying it.  Even following an in-depth appraisal of practice, the scope of the proportionality criterion is far from clear.  In contrast, the Caroline is clear, but offers no insight into the how to calculate or apply proportionality: it does little more than identify the requirement that action of self-defense should not be ‘excessive’.  Thus simply invoking the Caroline is of limited practical use in terms of the application of the proportionality criterion to self-defense actions today.  Nonetheless, the Caroline formula is a useful starting point for understanding this area of the law. 

iii) Imminence and Immediacy

It is convenient for a number of reasons to examine the temporal elements of imminence and immediacy under a separate heading from either ‘necessity’ or ‘proportionality’.  However, these elements should perhaps not be viewed as being ‘separate’ as such from the criteria already discussed, but rather are better seen as forming elements of the general requirement that any self-defense action be necessary and proportionate.​[147]​

Returning to Webster’s formula, it will be recalled that he held that self-defense can only be exercised in situations were the need to respond is ‘instant…leaving…no moment for deliberation.’​[148]​  This phrase obviously indicates that temporal proximity was viewed by Webster as being relevant to the question of self-defense in the Caroline episode.  It is also here worth noting Andrew Stevenson’s letter to Lord Palmerston, where he stated that, for self-defense, ‘the necessity must be imminent and extreme.’​[149]​

In examining the temporal elements of the customary international law regarding self-defense, it is important to keep in mind that the correspondences regarding the Caroline concerned a claim of what would today be classed as ‘anticipatory’ self-defense.​[150]​  The Caroline was supplying rebels who were yet to attack Canadian territory.  Therefore, the terms employed by Webster and Stevenson indicate a need for a temporal connection between the threat of attack and the response to it: a threat must be ‘imminent’.  

It is beyond the scope of this paper to reach a conclusion upon lawfulness of a forcible action taken in response to a threat, rather than an actual attack.   However, at this juncture, it is necessary to briefly refer to the idea of ‘imminence’ with regard to such self-defense claims.  This is because the concept of temporal proximity in self-defense claims made where no attack has yet occurred stems from the Caroline formula, and forms an aspect of the criterion of necessity and proportionality which should not be ignored in the current analysis.  

For our purposes it is useful to make a distinction at this point between claims of ‘anticipatory self-defense’ (where a threat is claimed to be imminent) and ‘pre-emptive-self-defense’ (where the perceived threat is more temporally remote).​[151]​  By looking at State practice since 1945, it is apparent that neither type of claim is made often.​[152]​  Nonetheless, in cases where self-defense has been argued in relation to a threat, States refer to the concept of a threat which was imminently apparent, much as Webster outlined.  

The classic example is the Israeli attack upon the Iraqi Osiraq nuclear reactor in June 1981.  Here, Israel explicitly justified its action as self-defense in response to a threat.​[153]​  In doing so, it stressed that the danger posed by the Iraqi reactor was imminent, in that if it had not been destroyed at that time, it would have been impossible to destroy it at all.​[154]​  States almost universally condemned the action.​[155]​  However, it is notable that a number of States did so on the basis that the threat to Israel was not imminent.​[156]​  Of course, many other States argued that the action was unlawful because self-defense against a threat was unlawful per se.​[157]​

Well before the Osiraq incident, in 1958, the United Kingdom justified its military operation in Jordan with what amounted to a fairly unique claim of collective anticipatory self-defense, in that it argued it was there to protect Jordan against an attack that was yet to manifest itself.​[158]​  In support of this claim, however, Jordan was very clear to stress that the threat against it was an imminent one.​[159]​  The United Kingdom itself made a similar point, though less explicitly.​[160]​  In the same way, so far as Pakistani action in Kashmir in 1948 was justified as a preventative action,​[161]​ that State made it clear that this was in response to ‘imminent danger that threatened the security of Pakistan.’​[162]​  

Therefore, whilst anticipatory self-defense is far from being universally accepted as lawful, those States that do support the doctrine in general employ the concept of imminence as a vital part of establishing the lawfulness of such action.​[163]​  This idea of imminence links directly to the Caroline formula.  Following the atrocities of September 11, however, the concept of self-defense against a non-imminent threat (or to use the terminology previously employed, ‘pre-emptive self-defense’) has been put forward, particularly by the United States.  The infamous National Security Strategy of 2002 made the arguable claim that ‘[f]or centuries, international law recognized that nations need not suffer an attack before they can lawfully take action themselves against forces that present an imminent danger of attack.’​[164]​  However, the document then went further, arguing that:

We must adapt the concept of imminent threat to the capabilities and objectives of today’s adversaries…The greater the threat, the greater is the risk of inaction – and the more compelling the case for taking anticipatory action to defend ourselves, even if uncertainty remains as to the time and place of the enemy’s attack.​[165]​

This so called ‘Bush Doctrine’ of pre-emptive self-defense (which seeks to abandon the ‘imminence’ criteria) is somewhat novel,​[166]​ and has in general not met with acceptance.​[167]​  Although Operation Iraqi Freedom was ultimately justified on the basis of Security Council authorization,​[168]​ pre-intervention indications that the United States may attempt to justify the action as self-defense​[169]​ were met with negative responses from States.  One of the main objections to this was that Iraq posed no imminent threat.  For example, Iran stated in March 2003 that:

The unilateral war against Iraq does not meet any standard of international legitimacy.  It is not waged in self-defense against any prior armed attack.  Nor, even by any stretch of the imagination, could Iraq, after 12 years of comprehensive sanctions, be considered an imminent threat against the national security of the belligerent Powers.​[170]​  

Similarly, Yemen condemned the concept of ‘[l]aunching war against others solely on the basis of reading their intentions.’​[171]​  Such statements echo the concerns raised by States regarding a lack of imminence with regard to Israel’s action in 1981.

Indeed, the terminology employed in the National Security Strategy itself indicates that customary international law as perceived by the United States in 2002 required that responses against threats could only be taken if such threats were ‘imminent’.  The United States itself was arguing in that document that imminence was a requirement that should be revised​[172]​ (and would, if the United States felt it necessary, be ignored),​[173]​ not that it was one that did not exist.

Therefore, leaving aside the arguable lawfulness of anticipatory self-defense, it is apparent that when such claims are put forward, accepted or not, they are generally accompanied by assertions that the threat being responded to was of an imminent nature.  In contrast, recent claims regarding pre-emptive self-defense have not in fact been advanced with regard to any actual State practice,​[174]​ but have nonetheless been criticized by other States.  In other words, it would seem that anticipatory self-defense is controversial but arguably lawful, whereas pre-emptive self-defense is in general regarded by States and scholars as being unlawful.  It is the issue of temporal connection, or imminence, which distinguishes these two claims: thus this aspect of the Caroline formula has a fundamental position with regard to distinguishing between controversial ‘anticipatory self-defense’ and patently unlawful ‘pre-emptive self-defense’.

It is not just in cases where the controversial claim of self-defense is made that temporal restrictions (as aspects of necessity and proportionality) are relevant to assessing the lawfulness of a forcible action.  In the uncontroversial situation of an action in self-defense taken in response to an actual attack, State practice indicates that there is still a need for a temporal proximity.  Here, ‘immediacy’ is a better term than ‘imminence’.  A criterion of ‘immediacy’ differs from that of ‘imminence’, in that the former refers the temporal proximity of the response to the attack being responded to.  The latter, in contrast, refers to the temporal proximity of the threat being responded to itself.  It should be noted that this distinction is one made by the author to ensure clarity, and is not prevalent in the pronouncements of States or in the legal literature.  In any event, these two concepts are closely linked.

Indeed, the phrase ‘instant, overwhelming’ necessity, ‘leaving…no moment for deliberation’ as employed in the Caroline formula can refer to either the concept of imminence or the concept of immediacy.  Although, the Caroline itself seemingly involved a claim of anticipatory self-defense, it certainly may be argued that the need to respond to an actual attack must be ‘instant’ and ‘overwhelming’: ‘action in self-defense must immediately follow upon the start of an attack.’​[175]​

Reference to contemporary State practice indicates that there should be some temporal link between the response taken to an actual attack (as opposed to a threatened attack) and the attack itself.  However, application of this restriction is highly fact-specific.  In the case of the Falklands, due to the geographical location of the islands​[176]​ and the scale of the necessary response, a period of twenty three days was seen as an acceptable time delay following the Argentine invasion.​[177]​  Of course, the continued occupation of the Falklands may be seen as a continuation of the attack; thus the need to respond remained compelling.​[178]​  Assuming that Operation Desert Storm was an action taken in collective self-defense, a period of five months elapsed between the initial attack against Kuwait and the response in self-defense.​[179]​  Again, though, there was continued occupation of Kuwait during this period.​[180]​  In the context of the coalition intervention in Afghanistan in 2001, so far as this may be seen as a response to the 11 September atrocities and not as an action of anticipatory self-defense,​[181]​ a delay of slightly under a month appears to have been acceptable,​[182]​ in spite of the fact that the attack had abated.​[183]​  This may have been due to the difficulties over intelligence gathering with regard to the perpetrators and the attempt to engage the Taliban diplomatically prior to the use of force.​[184]​

It therefore seems that some measure of temporal connection is required between the attack and the response to it: identifying a general principle as to what that connection should be, however, is more difficult.  The need for an ‘immediate’ response appears to be extremely flexible, perhaps even more so than the general criteria of necessity and proportionality.  Certainly it may be said that the requirement to act promptly is not absolute, and will depend on the context of the situation.

Indeed, given that an attempt to negotiate goes a long way to establishing necessity​[185]​ (not to mention the fact that such action is a desirable alternative to force on a moral level), if a State first tries to negotiate and then must resort to force following the failure of those negotiations, the time delay will not mean that the State falls foul of the temporal element of the necessity requirement:

If serious attempts are made to resolve the conflict through amicable means, surely the State that has pursued these alternative avenues cannot be faulted for having lost time unduly before it unleashes its armed forces.​[186]​

Thus it is argued that there must be an immediate need to respond, but not that there must necessarily be an immediate response.​[187]​  Rather, the response must be taken within reasonable temporal proximity, taking into account all the circumstances of the particular case: the difficulty of evidence gathering, the delay incurred though the mobilization of the responding State’s own forces, the time taken in attempts at negotiation, and so on.  

Therefore, as with the other aspects of necessity and proportionality, the Caroline formula identifies, and offers an insight into, the temporal elements of the customary international law regarding self-defense.  However, the formula itself does not indicate the complexity and inherent flexibility of these restrictions.  Certainly, in the case of the required temporal proximity between actual attacks and the responses taken, it would seem that this is a more flexible test than that of an ‘instant, overwhelming’ necessity, ‘leaving…no moment for deliberation’.

It has been argued that ideas of both immediacy and imminence in relation to self-defense are illogical in the context of the modern world.​[188]​  This argument is not exactly new: it has been stressed in relation to the unique nature of nuclear weapons since the inception of such armaments.​[189]​  Recently, however, this claim regarding the temporal aspects of the customary international law on self-defense has been restated in the context of twenty-first century terrorism.  This is on the basis that an inability to detect imminent terrorist threats, the need to gather information with regard to terrorist activities and the difficulties of mounting an instant response to such attacks mean that such temporal requirements should no longer be a requirement of self-defense.  This argument has been taken further: the suggestion has been made that a concept of temporality is no longer an aspect of the customary international law on self-defense.​[190]​  In fact, the temporal aspects of the Caroline formula and the potential impact of these upon the so-called ‘war on terror’ may be seen as the primary reason for the recent scholarly ‘attacks’ upon the Caroline.  The formula is no longer seen as relevant to customary international law because it restricts anti-terrorist operations. 

Away from such polemic conclusions, for good or ill, State practice clearly requires a level of imminence (or immediacy) in relation to self-defense: States still acknowledge the need for some kind of temporal link between a response in self-defense and the attack being responded to.  It may be arguable that these restrictions upon self-defense have become more flexible.  Since the advent of nuclear weapons, some level of flexibility with regard to the temporal proximity required is the only logical way that self-defense can be understood.  This ‘flexibility’ has arguably increased still further since 11 September 2001, in terms of what States will deem to be legally acceptable.  However, it is not the case that such temporal safeguards have disappeared from customary international law altogether.  Moreover, the general reaction of States to the Bush Doctrine indicates that the majority does not desire that this state of affairs changes.  In this context, therefore, the Caroline formula could in fact act as a timely reminder of the need for some kind of temporal proximity in actions taken in self-defense.

VI. Conclusions: Docking the Caroline

The above examination of State Practice and opinio juris indicates that the customary international law criteria of necessity and proportionality of today differ in some respects from the traditional Caroline formulation.  Although there are many similarities between them, the contemporary criteria of necessity and proportionality are not synonymous with Webster’s formula.  Admittedly, most of these alterations are subtle, and have as much to do with emphasis as substantive alterations, but they are present, nonetheless.  A good example of this is the idea of ‘instant, overwhelming’ necessity, ‘leaving…no moment for deliberation’.  This phrase may be seen as too strict in the contemporary context of ‘necessary’ self-defense.  This is true both in that this phrase suggests the need for the very survival, or at least vital interests, of the State to be at risk and that responses in self-defense must be literally immediate.  In fact, as we have seen, the necessity criterion has developed in a less fundamental form.

Due to such differences between Webster’s formula and the contemporary criteria, it would appear to be incorrect to refer to the Caroline formula as if it represents customary international law today.  Similarly, it is inaccurate to use the term ‘the Caroline’ while actually applying the contemporary criteria, as opposed to the Caroline formula itself.​[191]​  It is true that a number of writers invoke Caroline, while they in fact only apply it selectively.  This is obviously unhelpful: ‘[w]hile it is perfectly acceptable to suggest that a doctrine has outlived its usefulness, it is not sound practice to alter its meaning without clearly flagging the change.’​[192]​  

More importantly, the Caroline formula is too simplistic in many respects to be used as a label for the contemporary law of self-defense.  Of course, the Caroline only refers to some of the various aspects of the contemporary legal regulation of self-defense in international relations.​[193]​  However, even in the context of the ‘necessity and proportionality’ aspect of self-defense, the varied and complex application of these criteria today goes way beyond Webster’s formula.  As is evident from the above examinations of necessity and proportionality, they are extremely complex criteria.  They are highly flexible and difficult to apply.  Reference to the neat and compact Caroline formula may risk placing an unhelpful veil over this complexity. 

The best method of demonstrating this is to refer to our discussion of the proportionality requirement.  Applying this criterion to any given dispute requires a complex calculation involving the use of the very minimum of force necessary to secure the defensive goal to be achieved by the action, as well as some equivalence between the scale of the attack and the response taken.  This requires assessments of the means of attack, the duration of the response in relation to the defensive necessity, indeed, all manner of strategic calculations.  Essentially, the Caroline holds that actions in self-defense must not be ‘excessive’ and must be ‘limited by…necessity, and kept clearly within it’.  These phrases are hardly adequate in identifying the problems with regard to the actual application of proportionality to self-defense claims today.​[194]​

Given these conclusions, and of course the notable fact that States themselves rarely invoke the Caroline formula,​[195]​ it may seem as though one should concur with the revisionist view that the Caroline should be removed from scholarly discourse on the contemporary law of self-defense, as its invocation is legally inaccurate and merely confuses the issue.  As Occelli has put it, the Caroline needs to be ‘sunk’.​[196]​

Certainly, it must be concluded that the Caroline formula in itself does not represent the customary international law of today.  However, as we have seen, the criteria of necessity and proportionality are undeniable aspects of the law of self-defense today.​[197]​   The great similarity between the content of these criteria and Webster’s formula certainly suggests that the Caroline has markedly influenced their development.​[198]​  Therefore, the Caroline correspondence can be very useful in aiding understanding of the law governing the use of force in self-defense.

Reference to the incident can be very helpful in tracing the development of the customary international law governing self-defense.  Far more importantly, however, the Caroline formula is relevant to an understanding of much of the current law on self-defense, entirely because of the complexity of the contemporary State practice regarding necessity and proportionality.  Webster’s formula offers a simplistic but surprisingly accurate guide to the minefield of State’s legal claims regarding self-defense in the UN era which this article has in some measure attempted to negotiate.  An investigation of the requirements of necessity and proportionality in contemporary customary international law produces a picture of criteria that have a remarkable resemblance to the conception of self-defense set out in the Caroline correspondence, and as such, the formula is a most useful starting point for an investigation of this kind.  Having said this, reference to the Caroline correspondence alone is not an adequate substitute for such an investigation.  

The Caroline is an invaluable tool in aiding any understanding of the contemporary criteria, due to its similarities to, and influence upon, them.  Yet it is a tool which must be employed with care, and not referred to as representing customary international law in itself: ‘This standard has since [1837] been creatively sculpted, sometimes almost beyond recognition, but it is still the reference point for cases of national self-defense.’​[199]​  At a time when the threat of international terrorism looms large and the lawfulness of possible responses to this threat is shrouded in confusion, we need all the legal reference points we can get.

It can been seen from the examination of UN era practice in Section V how useful the Caroline formula can be in helping to form an understanding of the way certain aspects of the law on self-defense are applied today.  Indeed, if one delves somewhat deeper into the correspondence, there are other elements that can be of use in the context of contemporary self-defense claims.  For example, Webster offers an insight into the elastic nature of his formula, which is very relevant to understanding the inherent flexibility of necessity and proportionality as they are today.​[200]​  Another interesting, and largely overlooked, element of Webster’s formula is the suggestion that targets attacked in self-defense must be military in nature.  The Caroline correspondence indicates that ‘[i]t must be shown…that there could be no attempt at discrimination, between the innocent and the guilty.’​[201]​

Whilst such a criterion is a clear part of the contemporary jus in bello,​[202]​ a ‘military targeting’ requirement is not often discussed in the context of self-defense actions.​[203]​  However, in the Oil Platforms case, the Court indicated that such a requirement existed as an aspect of the necessity and proportionality criteria for lawful self-defense.​[204]​  A requirement that actions taken in self-defense must target military objectives is evident in State practice also, although whether this stems from the traditional international humanitarian law requirement or is in some manner specific to the jus ad bellum concerning self-defense is unclear.​[205]​  In any event, such issues demonstrate that a more detailed examination of the Caroline can further elucidate upon the nature of the law of self-defense today, beyond the traditional reading of the ‘key’ sentence from Webster’s letter.

Moreover, this role for the Caroline formula is not one which is restricted to the margins; it is not merely applicable to controversial ‘anticipatory’ claims of self-defense.  It will be recalled that the argument was raised above that the Caroline formula was intended to apply only to specific instances of self-defense.​[206]​  Irrespective of the accuracy of this claim, it is clearly evident from an analysis of State practice that the contemporary criteria of necessity and proportionality are not restricted to specific instances in this way.  For example, they are not restricted to actions against non-State actors (assuming that such actions are permissible as actions of self-defense).​[207]​  Necessity and proportionality are also clearly relevant to actions other than those taken in anticipatory self-defense.  Indeed, even though the temporal restriction of ‘imminence’ is specific to anticipatory self-defense, its twin criterion (that of ‘immediate’ response) can also be found in the Caroline formula.​[208]​  This restriction is still apparent in State practice regarding response to actual attacks.​[209]​  The Caroline is useful in understanding all claims of self-defense, not merely specific types.​[210]​

The development of the criteria of necessity and proportionality in self-defense from the original Caroline formula, as with the majority of customary international law, has been a slow but steady process.  It is not a startling new occurrence that the criteria as applied today are no longer identical to those contained in Daniel Webster’s letter.  Rather this comes from a process that began before the Caroline incident took place: the gradual development of the law on the use of force as it is today.  Undoubtedly, in the decades to come, as new challenges emerge and as new perceptions of international relations surface from both States and scholars alike, the applicable legal criteria will continue to change.  Indeed, this process is already underway, given an arguable shift in the international community’s perception of the law on the use of force following September 11.​[211]​  An appreciation of the Caroline incident and the way that customary international law has developed since 1837 will help us to keep pace with such changes to the regulation of force in international law, and meet the challenges posed by international terrorism, without loosing sight of the fundamental criteria of lawful self-defense.  
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